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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Examining the administrative and operational difficulties as well as the 
successes and failures of developing country competition law enforcement 
activities can help policymakers address the numerous difficulties accompanying 
the implementation of competition policies.1 As Umut Aydin and Tim Büthe 
explain in the introductory article of this symposium, there are a variety of 
criteria that should be taken into account when assessing performance, and those 
criteria vary across countries depending on the overall goals of the agencies 
themselves.2 Nonetheless, it is a task that is evidently necessary given the 
variation in performance across the world’s competition policy enforcement 
agencies, as the statistical appendix to this article demonstrates. To this end, this 
symposium has brought together an impressive array of interdisciplinary experts, 
practitioners, and scholars—all charged with critically appraising the successes 
and shortcomings of competition policy programs worldwide. By assembling both 
the “lessons learned” as well as derivative recommendations or remedies that 
address shortcomings, it is expected that policymakers and practitioners can 
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1. See, e.g., YANG-CHING CHAO, GEE SAN, CHANGFA LO & JIMING HO, INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW AND POLICIES (2001); COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
(D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013); COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Eleanor M. 
Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012); IGNACIO DE LEON, AN INSTITUTIONAL 
ASSESSMENT OF ANTITRUST POLICY (2009); IGNACIO DE LEON, LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY (2001); DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION 205–269 (2010). 
2.  Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes;
Exploring Possibilities and Limits, May 4 for a workshop on Competition Law and Policy in Developing 
Countries, The Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. 
RODRIGUEZ&MENON_PROOF_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2016  9:40 AM 
38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 37 
 
develop and deploy improved competition policy mechanisms to assist in the 
broader objective of enhancing developing nations’ economic growth. 
This institutional engineering task is a challenging undertaking. The 
competition law enforcement apparatus can be exceedingly well-positioned to 
curtail the abuses of naked horizontal cartels. And at that simple task agencies 
do a decent job, despite being bedeviled by procedural difficulties and 
methodological limitations.3 But they don’t succeed often because the naked, 
horizontal cartels at which they aim rarely exist. 
This point hinges on recognizing a distinction between private, “naked,” 
cartels and cartels that succeed by their proximity to and close historical 
association with the state—publicly sanctioned cartels, for lack of a better term. 
In this view, the latter—the tacitly or explicitly state-sanctioned cartels—are the 
norm in developing economies. The presence of these cartels, their interlinkages 
with the state, and the strength of the association are a product of a nation’s 
development. These state-sponsored cartels, also recognizable as combines, 
groups, or associations, are market participants that emerged historically to 
reduce transactions costs in response to artifacts and problems of development.4 
By contrast, naked private cartels emerge infrequently, unlikely to exist in pure 
form because they are unsustainable.5 
 
 3.  For instance, the effective prosecution of cartels requires “hot” or “hard” evidence. See infra 
text accompanying note 12. These include a written agreement among firms, a credible statement by a 
participant, an internal memorandum written to report a meeting with competitors in which an 
agreement was reached, notes of telephone conversations with competitors or a statement by a person 
who was approached by the cartel to join it—or any such artifact that implicates a participant or potential 
cartel participant in an illegal agreement. But it is rare to find written agreements setting out the terms, 
conditions and details of a collusive agreement. Moreover, written agreements are not necessary given 
the strength of the tacit agreements forged by participants. The recurring nature of transactions and 
interactions between and among group members ensures the stability of the association. And the norms 
and informal ties that bind interest group participants are sufficiently strong to ensure the required cartel 
discipline. Setting aside the question of whether hot documents exist, agencies are still handicapped by 
their ability to reach them. Antitrust enforcement has the ability to subpoena documents and individuals, 
the authority to conduct unannounced inspections known as “dawn-raids,” and the right to enter into 
leniency agreements with cartel participants. However, their deployment effectiveness varies across 
jurisdictions. In practical terms, agencies have limited or circumscribed capabilities to the extent they 
exist at all. See generally A.E. RODRIGUEZ & ASHOK MENON, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION POLICY 
(2010). 
 4.  See Mauro F. Guillen, Business Groups in Emerging Economies: A Resource-Based View, 43 
ACAD. MGMT J. 362, 363 (2000) (“Groups step in where the market does not work or is not allowed to 
work by institutionalizing and alternative allocation mechanism so that production can take place.”); 
Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 138 (2000) 
(“Extensive fieldwork has by now established that individuals in all walks of life and all parts of the world 
voluntarily organize themselves so as to gain the benefits from trade, to provide mutual protection against 
risk, and to create and enforce the rules that protect natural resources.”). 
 5.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 285–291 (4th ed. 1992); George J. 
Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1964) (pointing out that it may be difficult for 
firms to reach a consensus even with few firms competing in a market; and any consensus achieved may 
be upset by cheating). Indeed, the desire to curtail the pervasive and insidious relationship between the 
private sector and the state, which results in preferential treatment or protection, is the whole reason for 
antitrust’s emphasis on competition advocacy. On the elements and outlook on domestic and 
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Competition policy’s remit is broad. It reaches beyond challenging narrow 
horizontal collaborations among competitors. It brings to bear the full array of 
antitrust proscriptions against a wide range of business practices ranging from 
vertical practices, abuse of dominant positions, commonplace horizontal 
practices, to full-fledged merger reviews. 
As a practical and operational matter, the metrics and procedures on which 
antitrust enforcement relies are inherently imperfect and may expose it to two 
kinds of decisionmaking errors. First, there is the possibility of prosecuting a pro-
competitive or competitively innocuous market practice. Or, second, it can 
overlook a patently anti-competitive one. Conventional antirust doctrine holds 
that there is little chance of error in prosecuting a naked cartel because naked 
cartels convey few pro-competitive benefits.6 On the other hand, as the agency 
seeks to target violations other than horizontal cartels, the possibility of 
unintentionally damaging pro-competitive behavior increases, and, as a result, 
the associated likelihood of error increases as well. 
Thus, the core enforcement tool of the agency’s tool kit, its most-effective, 
unambiguous and well-understood competition policy principle—the prohibition 
of per-se anti-competitive horizontal agreements orchestrated by private cartels 
—is a finely honed weapon aimed at an either scarce or inconsequential problem 
in most developing economies. In pursuing more ambiguous business practices, 
false-positives are inevitable because distinguishing pro-competitive conduct 
from unambiguously harmful conduct is an inherently difficult task.7 
This article advances the following proposition: the level of antitrust 
enforcement activity in developing economies should be markedly lower than its 
level in developed ones. The reasoning turns on the following claims: particular 
 
international competition advocacy, see INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY WORKING GRP., 
“ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY” REPORT (2002), http://www.internationalcompetition 
network.org/working-groups/current/advocacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/8LHS-4BYK]; R. Shyam Khemani 
& John Clark, Competition Advocacy, in A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (R. Shyam Khemani & Andre Barsony eds., 1998), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/438795/framework-design-implementation-
competition-law-policy [https://perma.cc/BMP8-A6UG]; Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of 
Competition: The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, REMARKS BEFORE THE ICN PANEL ON 
COMPETITION ADVOCACY AND ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES (Sept. 28, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2002/09/creating-culture-competition-essential-role-competition-advocacy [https://perma.cc/ 
CN4Q-WBRK]. For recent critical commentary on competition advocacy, see Maurice E. Stucke, Better 
Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951 (2008). 
 6.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001). See also C. Frederick Beckner & 
Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 70–73 (1999) (outlining the 
full scope of this traditional perspective); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1984); David S. Evans & Jorge A. Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral 
Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005). 
 7.  See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 39 (“Antitrust is an imperfect tool for the regulation of 
competition. Imperfect because we rarely know the right amount of competition there should be, because 
neither judges nor juries are particularly good at handling complex economic arguments, and because 
many plaintiffs are interested in restraining rather than promoting competition.”). 
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conditions of developing economies make the likelihood of antitrust enforcement 
error greater; and collaboration among firms is an endogenous, pervasive, 
necessary and often pro-competitive practice that emerged in response to the 
historical presence of high transaction costs endemic to developing areas. The 
scant presence of private cartels relative to all commercial entities suggests a low 
prevalence or base-rate. A failure to account for the presence of a low base rate 
event enhances the likelihood of error in forensic outcomes, specifically, a greater 
realization of false positives.8 Sensitivity to the high cost associated with possible 
prosecutorial overreach suggests that competition policy, in its operation, should 
tread lightly and operate under a presumption of error. 
In this narrative, trade associations, family-owned, or ethnic, industrial, and 
corporate groups, or any other variant of “self-regulating” entities found in 
developing economies are an organizational alternative to reduced, inadequate, 
or limited administrative guidance by the state. They exist due to limited access 
to capital and managerial talent, as well as political and socio-economic 
transaction costs unlikely to be significant in successful market economies.9 These 
entities help coordinate decisions and efforts among association members. They 
therefore reduce transaction costs and create value for their members and others. 
The presence of these interest groups conveys both benefits and costs to the 
economy and its development. As a result, the targeting of seemingly (and 
possibly) anti-competitive business practices without a recognition of the 
countervailing pro-competitive benefits results in enforcement errors that are 
much more damaging than the enforcement errors in developed economies. In 
sum, the prospective social costs of enforcement actions appear substantially 
greater than the benefits. This would suggest a more muted role for competition 
policy as a development instrument, to the extent that the error–cost tradeoff 
should inform the emphasis or aggressiveness of antitrust enforcement. 
This hypothesis is illustrated and examined in the article. Part II describes and 
explains the source of the uncertainty that begets antitrust enforcement errors in 
developing economies. Part III describes the relevance and comparatively 
greater influence of business groups, industry, and regional associations, among 
others, which constitute private social networks that convey pro-competitive 
benefits. Part IV provides an accounting of the particularities of developing 
economies, and specifically the characteristics that handicap competition policy 
 
 8.  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153–160 (R. Kahnemen, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds., 1982). 
 9. Guillen, supra note 4. See also Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous 
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 356 (1981) 
(describing how tightly knit social relationships can substitute for law); Barak D. Richman, Norms and 
Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 766 (2012) (arguing that “legal and legal-like 
processes must be viewed within the underlying social and economic context in which they appear”); 
AVNER GREIF & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE CLAN AND THE CORPORATION: SUSTAINING COOPERATION 
IN CHINA AND EUROPE 1, 6–7 (Sept. 26, 2015) (highlighting the similarities between Chinese clans and 
European clans and their importance in cooperative interactions), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2565120 [https://perma.cc/2KG6-TGC8].  
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practice in its orthodox deployment. Part V explains the impact of enforcement 
actions on the relative costs of colluding privately versus seeking state-sanctioned 
protections. Part VI offers some concluding comments. 
A few caveats are necessary; as is a careful delineation of the scope of the 
commentary. This article does not seek to add to the copious scholarship on 
informal norms, private enforcement mechanisms, or private orderings—terms 
often used interchangeably. The article provides an overview of the extent to 
which the pro-competitive benefits of the social capital present among members 
of close-knit groups should be accounted for in the administration of the 
competition laws in developing economies. And last, although it draws from the 
work of commentators who question antitrust enforcement’s general 
effectiveness, this article’s analysis of antitrust policy is focused exclusively on its 
incantation in developing economies.10 
It follows, as a matter of policy, that antitrust in developing economies—if it’s 
to be had at all—should be relegated to its core function: the curtailment of 
horizontal price-fixing.11 The current observed ineffectiveness of competition 
policy enforcement in developing countries rests to a great extent on the massive 
enforcement agenda with which the enforcement agencies are saddled, the 
multiple and often contradictory policy goals, and the unattainable expectations 
heaped on competition policy. Competition policy agencies in developing 
countries should, at least in the short-term, focus on horizontal practices; all other 
 
 10.  Abel Mateus, Competition and Development, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 1, at 115 (“Even among developed countries and even within the organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), enforcement of antitrust has encountered major obstacles.”); 
David Teece, Favoring Dynamic Over Static Competition: Implications for Antitrust Policy and Policy, in 
COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY 203, 205 (Geoffrey Manne & Joshua 
Wright eds., 2011) (setting as the motivation for his study “the lack of compelling evidence indicating that 
antitrust is not aiding consumers”); R.W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve 
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 4 (2003) (finding “little empirical 
evidence that past interventions have provided much direct benefit to consumers”); Paul E. Godek, A 
Chicago-school approach to antitrust for developing economies, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 261, 262 (1998) 
(“For developing countries, in particular for those post-communist countries attempting to create the 
basic core of capitalism, antitrust may be an unnecessary and potentially harmful encumbrance. That is, 
since there is no free lunch it might be better for those countries to skip this particular meal.”). 
 11.  The adoption of antitrust laws in developing countries may not have been a result of any 
endogenous political process. Rather commonly, embracing antitrust was instrumental, a quid pro quo 
that allowed admittance into a particular multilateral institution, or an element of the conditionality tied 
to financial assistance. In numerous instances, the lack of antitrust legislation and policy often precluded 
trade with a developed country or trade bloc.  Such pressures, more often than not, compelled nations to 
act and adopt competition legislation to comply with treaty obligations: this is not an endogenous process 
in the conventional sense.  See Dina Waked, Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and 
How of Adoption and Its Implications for International Competition Law, 1 GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 
69, 69 (2008) (“The motives to adopt these laws have varied. In some instances, rules have been adopted 
over the course of many years in response to local pressures, in order to mend behaviours imposing social 
costs on societies. In other instances, rules have been recommended as tools to achieve development. In 
yet other circumstances, they were imposed through treaties and international pressure. Most developing 
countries either adopted competition rules in response to recommendations of international institutions 
or because of various obliging treaties they signed.”). 
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activities can be too costly, expensive, and counterproductive for competition 
agencies in developing countries to implement effectively. 
II 
THE SOURCE OF ERRORS 
The difficulties involved in proving the illegal nature of cartels and other anti-
competitive agreements among firms are well known. Antitrust authorities can 
only prosecute the makers of collusive agreements if there is hard evidence of 
violations of the proscribed conduct.12 This high threshold makes collusion very 
difficult to combat. But proceeding with less than conclusive evidence may 
ultimately lead to mistakenly taking action against practices that only seem anti-
competitive but in reality are not collusive. 
Investigating and prosecuting is costly. But investigations and false 
prosecutions also create unintentional social costs by “chilling competitive 
behavior,” and instill reluctance to take risks and innovate practices for fear of 
running afoul of the competition agency.13 Such litigation risk, or simply the fear 
of attracting unwanted regulatory attention, could even dissuade firms from 
deploying practices that might be only remotely similar to the scrutinized practice 
for fear of it being confounded. In fact, as a result of the potentially significant 
unfavorable impact on net welfare, several scholars have noted that it might be 
optimal for society to tolerate some degree of seemingly anti-competitive 
behavior among firms or—equivalently—that enforcement err on the side of 
caution and restraint.14 
 
 12.  See Geoffrey A. Manne & Marcellus Williamson, Hot Documents vs. Cold Economics: The Use 
and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 610 
(warning against using documentary proxies for economic relevance) (2005); Organization for Economic 
Cooperation & Development, Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence of Agreement, 9 OECD J. 
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 49, 53 (2007) (“It can be difficult to convince courts to accept circumstantial 
evidence in cartel cases, especially where the potential liability for having violated the anti-cartel 
provisions of the competition law is high.”); Darren S. Tucker & Kevin L. Yingling, Too Hot to Handle: 
Internal Party Documents in Whole Foods and Other Modern Merger Challenges, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Oct. 2007, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct07_Tucker 
10_18f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9XR-K63B]. 
 13.  Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 375 (2005) (“Despite the veneer of certainty suggested by the scientific method of 
economics, there continues to be a large degree of potential error in antitrust enforcement, and such 
errors may result in substantial economic costs.”). 
 14.  See, e.g., David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric 
Information, 99 ECON. J. 408, 408 (1989) (showing “that asymmetric information can be a significant 
factor in the decision to tolerate some degree of collusion even though price fixing is illegal per se”); 
Stephen Martin, Competition Policy, Collusion and Tacit Collusion, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1299, 1299 
(2006) (finding that when communication is not too costly, explicit collusion may be more profitable as it 
has the potential to reduce the incentives to defect); Saïd Souam, Optimal Antitrust Policy Under 
Different Regimes of Fines, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2001) (comparing the efficiency of two different 
regimes of fines against cartels when antitrust authorities have limited resource). See also F.M. SCHERER, 
COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY, 43–46 (1994) (“There are several 
reasons why individual nations might permit or even encourage cartels and other horizontal agreements 
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The arguments favoring tolerance of some potentially anti-competitive 
activity, under certain conditions, typically call attention to the costs of errors 
brought about by the mistaken prosecution of cartels or seemingly anti-
competitive practices. In antitrust practice, both false positives and false 
negatives are inevitable, given the inherent difficulty of distinguishing efficient, 
pro-competitive business conduct from anti-competitive behavior.15 
To determine pro-competitive and anti-competitive behavior, a Competition 
Policy Authority requires accurate metrics. For example, the fundamental 
premise in efficiency-based antitrust practice holds that any observed persistent 
and significant departures between observed prices and marginal costs are 
indications of anti-competitive pricing.16 If such a difference is present, it raises a 
presumption of illegality.17 But marginal costs are fiendishly difficult to measure. 
And the price–marginal cost gap reflects various attributes specific to the time 
and place that the transaction for a particular good or service takes place. These 
imprecise metrics can lead to sources of errors and both false positives and false 
negatives and impact a pro-competitive business environment. 
Errors may result from a misunderstanding of the nature of price–marginal 
cost gaps. Any product or service can be viewed as a bundle of attributes. Upon 
close examination one can quickly discern those from which a product or service 
is made. But the numerous intangibles that were required to secure the product 
at the particular location and time are not visible to casual inspection. Thus, a 
 
with an impact on international trade.”); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits 
of the Market: the Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 171, 173  
(2011) (applying antitrust laws to innovative companies in dynamic markets has always been a perilous 
proposition, and despite significant advances in economics and jurisprudence, it remains so); J. Gregory 
Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition and Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 
631 (2009) (“If nothing else, a wider appreciation of the importance of dynamic competition for 
innovation and consumer welfare may temper the hubris that the uninformed sometimes bring to 
antitrust analysis.”).  
 15.  See Easterbrook, supra note 6. 
 16.  See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY THEORY AND PRACTICE 41–42 (2004) (stating 
that since the lowest possible price a firm can profitably charge is the price which equals the marginal 
cost of production, market power is usually defined as the difference between the prices charged by a 
firm and its marginal costs of production); Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another 
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (The Nirvana Fallacy contains three elements. First, ignore the 
costs of corrective economic policy interventions by government but account for costs on consumers and 
on the economy. Numerous empirical attempts to appraise the costs of monopoly prices on the U.S. 
economy and elsewhere have not been very persuasive suggesting that the costs of enforcement far 
outweigh the losses. Second, the antitrust model is driven by efficiency considerations and disregards the 
true tastes and preferences of consumers in developing economies who possibly rank, given the disparity 
in wealth, equity considerations higher than they do economic efficiency considerations (getting prices 
right). Third, antitrust analysts often assume that markets in developing countries are perfectible. This 
perfection is unattainable. Markets are what they are in effect as a response to any number of 
institutional, normative, historical considerations.). 
 17.  The determination of the critical significance of the price–cost gap is context dependent to some 
extent. Moreover, its interpretation may vary across jurisdictions. The threshold might be different 
depending on the industry and the particular competition problem being scrutinized. MOTTA, supra note 
16, at 41.  
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customer purchasing a banana in downtown New Haven pays a price that covers 
the elusive costs of getting the banana to the supermarket. 
But the transaction reflects still more. The true value of the banana also 
contains the value of embedded knowledge of international and domestic 
logistics, marketing relationships, climate and weather characteristics, 
exclusionary distributional arrangements, highly specialized and transaction-
specific shipping and other transport equipment, tropical farming expertise, 
financial management, accounting, and many other aspects of specialized 
knowledge, including an understanding of the prevailing mores, relationships, 
and customary business practices. 
When one thinks of products and services in these terms, transactions take on 
a different meaning. In developing economies, where markets may be less 
developed or thinner, the attributes that are embodied in products are necessarily 
distinctive.  In fact, the price–cost gaps arise to some extent because of the returns 
that accrue to these attributes that exist because of the lack of fully competitive 
markets. The attributes contributing to the value of a product will differ in that 
some will reflect characteristics of the particular social and economic context and 
circumstance. 
These attributes are sundry. They may include: varying returns to quality 
differentials; transactional, currency and financial risk; scarcity; safety and 
security premiums; costs of doing business, such as bribes or assurances; and 
generalized costs, such as taxes, surcharges, or location. Equivalently, disparities 
between international and domestic prices for a particular good or service may 
constitute a price differential attributable to transaction costs of trading 
internationally such as freight, custom charges, or duties; and relatedly, premiums 
reflecting context-related transactions costs.18 
Price asymmetries and price–marginal cost gaps may also reflect distinct 
commercial practices involving differentiated products. These divergences may 
be due to unobserved differences in costs such as opportunity costs, quality, risks, 
varying levels (and associated costs) of opportunism, and the number of ancillary 
products or services. Or the price difference may be due to one of the many 
attributes that naturally combine to provide value—and often individualized 
 
 18.  See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an 
Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 602 (2003) (“In 
virtually all real-world markets competitive firms produce goods and services that are unique in some 
dimension. As a result, each firm faces less than a perfectly elastic demand. Real-world competitive firms, 
therefore, price above marginal cost and may find it profitable to price discriminate.”); A.E. Rodriguez 
& Jeffrey I. Rosenbaum, Is the Exercise of Market Power by Distributors in Newly Liberalized Economies 
Preventing Trade Gains? An Empirical Inquiry, 22 WORLD COMPETITION 65, 73 (1999) (finding no 
support for an inference of supra-competitive returns in distribution services in Latin America). See also 
POOJA POKHREL ET AL., PRICE VARIATIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE 1–2 (2015) (finding that existing market 
price variations between locales in Mozambique and South Africa are attributable to red-tape, poor 
infrastructure, costly warehousing and inventory facilities, and state-sanctioned protectionist policies in 
the case of sugar); Malcolm B. Coate & A.E. Rodriguez, Pitfalls in Merger Analysis: The Dirty Dozen, 
30 U.N.M.L. REV. 227, 230–34 (2000) (listing documented instances of errors in merger analysis). 
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value—to the consumer in a particular setting. These individualized attributes 
constitute tangible features as well as intangible ones, such as the extent and 
nature of the ongoing and recurring business relationship between a customer 
and supplier. Commercial trading arrangements in developing economies may 
reflect long-standing trading relationships among parties typical of smaller, less 
complex economies. 
Parties to a transaction often rely on personalized exchanges to facilitate 
trade. They benefit from the presence of reputational capital and other informal 
mechanisms. The price differential charged by a seller may reflect some 
particular feature of the business relationship in the cost of the commodity. 
Embedded in the transaction price, for instance, may be an implicit financing 
charge or, perhaps, an adjustment for an exclusionary agreement. Or there may 
be a commitment by the seller to absorb some of the downside risk—a promise 
to “take care of the buyer” when prices decline. In other words, transactions are 
likely to incorporate relationship-specific circumstances derived from the nature 
of personal transactions.19 
Industries that require considerable up-front investment are another context 
in which prices will not necessarily equal marginal cost. Many “new economy” 
markets, including software, video games, mobile telecommunications, as well as 
many “old economy” markets, such as pharmaceuticals, reflect this feature of 
high fixed costs and modest incremental costs.20 As a result, these industries have 
a built-in difference between prices and marginal cost. Therefore, approaching 
perceived competition problems in these markets—to the extent that they exist 
in developing countries—based on the conventional understanding of price–
marginal cost gaps is theoretically inappropriate and may lead an investigator to 
mistakenly infer the presence of anti-competitive behavior.21 
These examples show that the presence of price–marginal cost gaps in 
developing economies is not necessarily evidence of influence over market 
conditions—like a finding of market power would require. Rather, observed 
price differentials may instead be a response to market conditions. 
 
 19.  This is the key tenet in Transaction Cost Economics; non-standard agreements reflect the 
reduced the cost of transacting, accounting especially for the anticipated costs of opportunism derived 
from relationship-specific investments. As such, their presence reduces the cost of conducting economic 
activity. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15 (1985). 
 20.  See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 926 (2001) 
(characterizing new economy as follows: “by falling average costs (on a product, not firm, basis) over a 
broad range of output, modest capital requirements relative to what is available for new enterprises from 
the modern capital market, very high rates of innovation, quick and frequent entry and exit, and 
economies of scale in consumption (also known as “network externalities”), the realization of which may 
require either monopoly or interfirm cooperation in standards setting”); Robert W. Hahn, A Primer on 
Competition Policy and the New Economy (AEI-Brookings Center for Reg. Stud., Working Paper No. 
01-03, Feb. 2001) (“The basic conundrum that antitrust authorities face is that scale economics in 
production and consumption provide an economic justification for having a single firm dominate a 
market.”).  
 21.  See Demsetz, supra note 16. 
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The lack or poor quality of data in many developing economies also raises 
problems that can lead to errors. In antitrust investigations, applicable metrics 
must frequently be constructed with poor-quality data—assuming there is any 
relevant data to be had at all.22 The data required to construct market shares, 
prices, measures of cost, concentration, potential entrants, and barriers to entry 
have to reflect the particular antitrust markets under consideration.23 Antitrust 
investigations must define the particular product and geographic markets in 
which the parties to a transaction compete. Institutional statistics assembled by 
national statistics agencies under common industry standard codifications were 
not assembled for purposes of antitrust investigations.24 They are, for the most 
part, useless for antitrust practice. 
Errors may also arise in the gathering of testimony. Agencies often refer to 
testimony from customers, industry participants, and third parties.25 For instance, 
the construction of antitrust product and geographic markets involves asking 
market participants a series of hypotheticals.26 Similarly, the appraisal of the 
conditions of entry into the constructed product and geographic markets relies 
on hypotheticals and assessments of likelihoods.27 Hypotheticals are also used 
when devising a “theory of competition” that seemingly reflects the behavior of 
participants in the market being examined.28 There may be doubts regarding the 
honesty or objectivity of witnesses. There may also be doubts because even 
honest and unbiased witnesses may be mistaken in their perception. The end 
result is that the entire investigative process is fraught with uncertainties. 
 
 22.  Data is required for the various antitrust constructs used in enforcement practice, such as 
product and geographic market definitions required to establish an actionable antitrust market. Antitrust 
markets constitute all reasonable substitutes—across product and geographic space—to the particular 
product being examined. For example, it entails determining if the sole manufacturer of cellophane 
directly competes with producers of saran wrap, wax paper, or aluminum foil. If it is determined that 
these are reasonable substitutes, the antitrust ‘‘product’’ market may be defined as one that includes all 
these products. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 98–
109 (4th ed. 1994) (detailing how rare it is for the data assembled by government statistical agencies match 
a product or geographic market under antitrust scrutiny).  
 23.  See, e.g., GUIDELINES, infra note 25, at 8; MALCOLM B. COATE & A.E. RODRIGUEZ, THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGER 5 (1997); ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, 
ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 117 (4th ed. 1994).  
 24.  Gregory J. Worden, The Divergence of SIC Industries for Antitrust Markets: Some Evidence from 
Price-Fixing Cases, 28 ECON. LETTERS 193, 193 (1988) (explaining how SIC four-digit industries often 
are far broader in product and/or geographic scope than antitrust markets and that the divergence 
between the two is greater than suggested in the literature).   
 25.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 4–
6 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KN6-6N6U] (“The Agencies consider many sources of 
evidence in their merger analysis. The most common sources of reasonably available and reliable 
evidence are the merging parties, customers, other industry participants, and industry observers.”). 
 26.  See id. at 7–15 (defining the market for purposes of applying the horizontal merger guidelines). 
 27.  See id. at 27–31 (examining entry or adjustments to pre-existing plans induced by mergers). 
 28.  Id. (“In assessing whether entry will be timely, likely, and sufficient, the Agencies recognize that 
precise and detailed information may be difficult or impossible to obtain.”). 
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Thus, theoretical imprecision in the conceptualization of the price–marginal 
cost gap, the uncertainty associated with development of routine, conventional 
antitrust constructs⎯product and geographic markets, entry, competitive 
effects⎯required to examine each particular violation, the uncertainty of witness 
testimony, and data imprecisions and unavailability all exist in the formulation of 
a possible antitrust inquiry. Each of these elements compounds the overall 
uncertainty confronting an antitrust decisionmaker appraising whether a 
particular practice warrants investigation. And each element increases the chance 
of making an incorrect decision. 
The error costs of antitrust prosecutions in developing economies are no less 
damaging than those inflicted on developed economies. But the errors of 
prosecution are also comparatively more likely and possibly more consequential 
than in developed economies. 
III 
THE COSTS OF ERRORS VARY WITH THE CONTEXT 
Keiretsu-like business conglomerates, groups, associations, or business 
clusters have a comparatively greater influence in developing economies than 
they do in developed countries.29 In developing economies these interest groups 
simultaneously impart pro-competitive benefits as well as anti-competitive 
effects. Since Macaulay, it has been recognized that some measure of assurance 
and predictability can be supplied to markets via informal means.30 Small, stable 
social networks provide the necessary context for the reliance on informal social 
 
 29.  Keiretsu is a Japanese term ascribed to a business group with interlocking business relationships. 
More generally, business groups are entities that control and coordinate two or more distinct legal 
companies through commonly held ownership stakes, often complemented by social and familial ties. 
Thus, our discussion encompasses, inter alia, Korean Chaebols, the Indian business houses, Turkish 
family holdings, and Latin American and Spanish Grupos. Paul Sheard, Keiretsu, Competition, and 
Market Access, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 502 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 
1997) (detailing how Keiretsu represent efficient forms of economic organization, conditioned by 
historical circumstance, and adapted to Japan’s unique business and market environment). See also Mark 
Granovetter, Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modern Economy, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 93, 
93 (1995); Nathaniel H. Leff, Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: 
The Economic Groups, 26 ECON. DEV.  CULTURAL CHANGE 661, 663 (1978) (arguing that networks in 
which participants are “linked by relations of interpersonal trust, on the basis of similar, personal, ethnic, 
or communal background have emerged in response to institutional failures”). Although business groups 
exist in both developed and developing markets, business groups constitute the dominant organizational 
form in developing economies. See Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be 
Wrong For Emerging Markets, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 41, 41 (1997) (“[H]ighly diversified business groups 
can be particularly well suited to the institutional context in most developing economies. From the 
Chaebols in Korea, to the Business Houses of India, to the Grupos of Latin America, conglomerates can 
add value by imitating the functions of several institutions that are present only in advanced economies. 
Successful groups effectively mediate between their member companies and the rest of the economy.”); 
Tarun Khanna & Jan Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in Emerging 
Markets, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 45, 45 (2001) (explaining a striking feature of most emerging 
economies: the prominent role played by business groups). 
 30.  See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 55–67 (1963) (outlining this theory of informal regulation for the first time). 
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relations and norms, and informal sanctions to negotiate and enforce 
agreements.31 These collaborations could be traditional “middleman” ethnic or 
tribal associations. Or, and often with some overlap, the collaborations can be 
regional groups and even political, party-affiliated groups. Their prosperity is 
attributable to commercial networks and informal, often highly efficient capital 
and managerial markets based on common ties and the group’s reserve of social 
capital.32 Taking antitrust action against the business practices of these groups is 
likely to inflict damage on total social welfare because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing the pro-competitive effects of business practices from the anti-
competitive ones. 
But the presence of collaborative and self-interested groups is not necessarily 
always pro-competitive. To the contrary—the trust and group cohesiveness that 
once imparted pro-competitive benefits, thereby facilitating economic 
development, could end up reducing or impeding it. Economic exchange 
sustained largely by personal relationships of trust and reciprocity can impede 
the development of a functioning impersonal market economy if no interaction 
outside the group is possible. If exchanges are limited to reciprocal ones, the 
number of prospective partners is limited and the search costs for finding a 
partner will be high.33 These limitations do not create the political and economic 
institutions that foster cooperative activity in impersonal exchange settings. 
 But a theoretical understanding of the possibility of a group’s negative impact 
is immaterial for enforcement purposes. The net competitive value of the various 
groups may still be unclear to the competition agency, and thus the uncertainty 
and possibility of error remains. 
  
 
 31.  See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 61–73 (1990) (detailing how these arrangements sanction individual actions by rewarding 
or punishing alternative courses of behavior). See also Avner Grief, Commitment, Coercion and Markets: 
The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 727 (C. Menard & M. Shirley eds., 2005); Benjamin Klein, Self-Enforcing Contracts, 141 J. 
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 594–600 (1985). 
 32.  Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Social Capital, Social Norms, and the New Institutional 
Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 727 (C. Menard & M. Shirley eds., 
2005); see generally Mike Wright, Igor Filatotchev, Robert E. Hoskisson & Mike W. Peng, Strategy 
Research in Emerging Economies, 42 J. MGMT, STUD. 1 (2005) (commenting on the different roles of 
social capital and networks in facilitating entry into emerging versus developed economies by emerging 
economy firms); William Wan, Robert E. Hoskisson, Jeremy C. Short & Daphne W. Yiu, Resource-Based 
Theory and Corporate Diversification: Accomplishments and Opportunities, 37 J. MGMT. 1335, 1359 
(2011) (explaining how, in emerging and transitioning economies, non-market capital (e.g., political 
capital or social capital) is likely a more important means for firm diversification and growth than is 
market capital (e.g., brand awareness)). 
 33.  See Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal vs. Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading 
Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 15 (1984); Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal 
Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830, 830 (1996) (examining the persistence of 
reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and 
monetary market exchange). 
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Even if properly deployed, the enforcement of competition law promises to 
fall short because it effectively reaches only private antitrust practices.34 Very few 
countries have antitrust laws that provide the ability to prosecute commercial 
activities of the state; even fewer have the political will to do so.35 Few private 
groups, understood to be those that operate independently of the state, exist in 
developing economies.36 Interest groups everywhere typically and routinely avail, 
 
 34.  Few competition authorities are capable of enjoining anti-competitive practices of other state 
institutions; indeed, in some instances they are proscribed from doing so.  More generally, there are other 
limitations and impediments afflicting the effectiveness of antitrust. These include, inter alia: weak 
judicial institutions; corruption; limited experience with antitrust law and practice across key elements of 
society, including the judiciary, academia, and the press; the proliferation of goals other than economic 
efficiency; and manpower shortages. See generally RODRIGUEZ & MENON, supra note 3. In addition, 
there is evidence to suggest that the objectives of efficiency-based competition programs in transition 
and developing economics are poorly understood. A.E. Rodriguez & Lesley DeNardis, Assessing 
Competition Policy Performance Metrics: Concerns About Cross-Country Generalisability, 7 INDIAN J. 
ECON. & BUS. 95, 95–100 (2008).  
 35.  UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., APPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION LAW: 
EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 11 (2002) (“A survey of selected countries indicates that most 
competition laws either exempt specific sectors and/or types of economic activity, and/or have provisions 
for the granting of such exemptions in given situations. It is worth observing that there generally tend to 
be fewer exemptions in countries which have recently adopted competition laws (mainly developing and 
transition market economies) as compared with more industrialized nations. However, this could be 
reflective of the fact that in many of the less developed countries, effective implementation of 
competition law has yet to take place. And various businesses are likely to be still unaware of the 
potential impact that competition law can have on their economic activities, and lobbying for exclusions 
from the application of competition law may yet take place. Indeed, casual observation suggests that in 
more advanced industrial countries, exemptions granted from competition law have generally tended to 
evolve and expand over time because of specific issues and cases confronted in the application of the law, 
and the resulting lobbying by business.”), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclpmisc25_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5XXR-V7VD]; Ulf Böge, State imposed Restrictions of Competition and Competition 
Advocacy, ABA Spring Meeting, at 4 (Washington D.C., 29, March 2006) (“The regulated conduct 
defense, or in other words the precedence of anti-competitive regulation over competition law, exists in 
several jurisdictions. One example is the United States with a body of law known as the state action 
doctrine: If a US state or local government enacts legislation that eliminates competition, federal 
competition law may be displaced in certain circumstances.”); Roger Alan Boner, Antitrust and State 
Action in Transition Economies, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 71, 72 (1998) (“Because antitrust policy is often 
explained in terms of consumer welfare and other measures of economic efficiency, one might expect 
that the actions of state agencies and officials would have a prominent role in antitrust enforcement. Yet 
in most countries, quite the opposite is true. Antitrust enforcement in developed countries tends to focus 
upon the actions of private parties, and antitrust enforcement against the state is either absent or, more 
often, carefully confined.”).  
 36.  Leidy & Hoekman, infra note 37 (discussing direct and indirect influences that labor and 
industry lobbies can have on government policies related to free trade, especially in the context of 
protection from foreign competition). See also John H. Coatsworth, Obstacles to Economic Growth in 
Nineteenth Century Mexico, 83 AM. HIST. REV. 80, 94 (1978) (“The interventionist and pervasive 
arbitrary nature of the institutional environment forced every enterprise, urban or rural, to operate in a 
highly politicized manner, using kinship networks, political influence, and family prestige to gain 
privileged access to subsidized credit, to aid various stratagems for recruiting labor, to collect debts or 
enforce contracts, to evade taxes or circumvent the courts, and to defend or assert titles to land. Success 
or failure in the economic arena always depended on the relationship of the producer with political 
authorities—local officials for arranging matters close at hand, the central government of the colony for 
sympathetic interpretations of the law and intervention at the local level when conditions required it.”) 
Coatsworth’s is a generalized observation, despite being lifted from nineteenth-century Mexico. It would 
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or seek to avail, themselves of protection and advantage by state fiat; it is unlikely 
that any successful economic venture in developing countries succeeds without 
the tacit or explicit assistance of the state.37 And it is precisely this proximity to 
state munificence that enables interest groups to effectively side-step or 
neutralize the competition agency’s prosecutorial efforts. 
Barak Richman persuasively argues that in developing economies with 
underdeveloped legal systems, private orderings of cartels effectively replace 
weak formal legal systems of contract enforcement.38 Cartel-sponsored private 
orderings mobilize an affiliated group of merchants in a manner that ensures 
contractual agreements among cartel members.39 Thus, the presence of cartels 
guarantees competition-enhancing contractual transactions. Simultaneously, as 
cartels are wont to do, they also restrict competition. Richman writes about the 
tension that exists as a result of this dual function whereby the well-understood 
harms of groups as a restraint on competition compete with the underappreciated 
benefit of groups as a pro-competitive solution to legal failures.40 Richman 
insightfully conjoins his argument with the rich history of the economic success 
of the traditional “middleman” groups in developing economies.41 Middleman 
 
apply across all developing economies with expected variations attributable to differences in the 
idiosyncratic development of formal and informal constraints; Group pervasiveness is, of course, 
additionally inferred from: recognizing the various documented linkages that exist of collaboration 
among and between groups, supra note 29; infra note 38; from the solicitation of preferential treatment 
arising from the ease with which tariffs and non-tariff barriers are erected, supra note 35; and the 
persistent calls for increased and enhanced competition advocacy, supra note 5. 
 37.  For a survey of commentary on domestic gains as a result of tariff and non-tariff barriers, see 
Arye Hillman, International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade, in READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 129 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 
2008). For specific commentary on gains from non-tariff barriers derived from anti-dumping and 
environmental protocols, see, respectively Michael P. Leidy & Bernard J. Hoekman, Spurious Injury as 
Indirect Rent-Seeking: Free Trade Under the Prospect of Protection, 3 ECON. & POL. 111 (1991) 
(explaining how, under well-established injury criteria for protection, import-competing producers have 
an incentive, either collectively or individually, to feign injury) and C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism 
and Environmental Regulations: The New Nontariff Barriers, 11 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 47, 47 (1990) 
(reviewing economic and legal aspects of the growing role of environmental, health, and safety 
regulations operating as disguised barriers to trade). See also Mario Daniele Amore & Morten 
Bennedsen, The Value of Local Political Connections in a Low-Corruption Environment, 110 J. FIN. 
ECON. 387 (2013) (finding positive value in family connections with local politicians in Denmark, a 
country with strong political institutions); Paul Brockman, Oliver M. Rui & Huan Zou, Institutions and 
the Performance of Politically Connected M&As, 44 J. INT’L BUS. STUD., 833 (2013) (documenting 
relationships between political connections and corporate investments); Pramuan Bunkanwanicha, & 
Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Big Business Owners in Politics, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 22, 2133 (2009) 
(documenting the positive value of political connections in Thailand); Charles Calomiris, Raymond 
Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from 
Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399, 399 (2010) (documenting the value of political connections in 
China); Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1095 (2001) 
(documenting the positive value of political connections in Indonesia). 
 38.  See Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and Development Policy, 
in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 155. 
 39.  Id. at 165; NORTH, supra note 31, at 34, 55. 
 40.  Richman, supra note 38. 
 41. IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CULTURE, CAPITAL, AND ETHNIC NETWORKS (Ivan 
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groups are mostly ethnic emigres who marshal social capital into successful 
commercial ventures—often operating amidst and overcoming unwelcome 
environments from the domestic ethnic majority.42 
Also, the groups that emerged to facilitate negotiations and transactions with 
the state, including unions, political parties, military cliques, business 
associations, and regional concerns, simultaneously confer both benefits and 
costs to competition. These groups are not necessarily cartels in the traditional 
economic sense, but are interest groups that effectively reduce the transaction 
costs of managing the state including, among other attributes, the effective 
disciplining of group members.43 
Having structured the analysis in terms of the tradeoffs between pro-
competitive benefits and anti-competitive effects, the task remains to appraise 
the difficulties confronting the administration of competition law when the dual 
characteristics of a particular cartel or interest group are known to authorities. In 
plainer words, it is important to establish the conditions under which the 
competition authority should exercise prosecutorial discretion or restraint in 
deference to a broader social objective. 
This is not merely a conceptual exercise. Ulrike Schaede documents how 
Japanese trade associations have replaced waning state influence and assumed 
important regulatory functions of their own.44 Indeed, economic policy was  
 
 
Light & Parminder Bachu eds., 1993); DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 
(1998); THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW 477 (1996); THOMAS SOWELL, 
RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994); Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1044, 1046, 1054–65 (2004) (“market-dominant minorities are classic middleman 
minorities whose prosperity attributable to business networks and informal but efficient capital markets 
based on common ethnic ties and the group’s reserve of social capital”); Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, 
Personal and Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
15 (1984); Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997).  
 42.  SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 41, at 2, 11, 12, 47; Kevin Davis, et. al., Ethnically 
Homogeneous Commercial Elites in Developing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 331, 335 (2001) 
(asserting that deficiencies in formal institutions are not the sole, and may not even be the primary, reason 
why economically dominant ethnic minorities have been and will continue to be observed in developing 
countries). 
 43.  NORTH, supra note 31, at 55; Landa, supra note 9, at 354–55; James E. Rauch, Business and 
Social Networks in International Trade, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1177, 1180 (2001). 
 44. ULRICKE SCHAEDE, COOPERATIVE CAPITALISM: SELF-REGULATION, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, 
AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN JAPAN 1 (2000) (“Deregulation will not necessarily lead to increased 
competition across all Japanese industries. Rather, as Japan’s postwar industrial policy regime crumbles 
and the regulating ministries become less potent, many industries rely more than ever on the practice of 
‘self-regulation’—using trade associations to enforce trade rules and market controls. . . . As a result of 
self-regulation, many markets will remain as restricted as they are today, but this restriction will be based 
more on trade practices established by trade associations and less on government intervention in the 
marketplace.”); MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN’S BASIC MATERIALS 
INDUSTRIES 22 (1996) (“The institutions that carry out the cartels are usually trade associations, 
organizations of firms for the purpose of furthering the members’ collective interests. They may be either 
industry-specific or peak associations, combining businesses from any industries.”). 
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discussed, formed, and implemented largely through informal mechanisms 
involving trade associations of particular industries.45 
The implementing agents were more frequently cartels, facilitated by MITI but directly 
enforced by the trade associations. These cartels were sometimes legal, formally 
approved by MITI or the Fair Trade Commission. At other times, the cartels were 
largely informal, created through consultation between industry and MITI, sometimes 
with the understanding of the Fair Trade Commission, sometimes without. On rare 
occasions, the Fair Trade Commission would object to a cartel’s formation or attack an 
existing one. 
. . . . 
Disagreements led to fierce and bitter battles among the players in a given industrial 
field, but they rarely took their grievances public and even less frequently to the 
courts.46 
Thus, the social arrangements that emerge over time, which act as built-in 
stabilizers convey both pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive efforts.47 
The next part explains the relevance and importance of the informal norms, 
customs and practices characterizing close-knit communities in developing 
economies, and discusses their response to liberalization-driven changes. 
IV 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE FORMATION OF CARTELS AND CARTEL-LIKE 
STRUCTURES 
Deregulation, privatization, trade reform, and other liberalization initiatives 
create both gains and losses. Policies that reduce domestic barriers to trade, 
thereby stimulating imports and entry, create competition between imports and 
domestic production. This competition has distributive consequences that 
provide incentives for interests—firms, employees, and domestic suppliers—to 
seek protection from imports. 
The benefits of increased competition from imports are typically distributed 
broadly among consumers. The costs—on the other hand—are concentrated 
among import-competing industries. To illustrate, consider the following 
archetypal example: a hypothetical agricultural products firm in a small economy 
is anticipating a liberalization that will reduce historical barriers to entry that 
have heretofore successfully kept out competing products. Competing products 
are selling at a considerable discount in international markets and would 
effectively eviscerate the local producer if the current tariffs are eliminated. The 
local product manufacturer boasts a 300-gallon reactor or some comparable 
capability for the production of agricultural products, perfectly suitable—and 
 
 45.  Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 75 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
 46.  Id. at 95. 
 47.  But see Sheard, supra note 29, at 541 (“Despite the frequent use of terms such as ‘cartel-like’ 
and ‘collusive’ to describe them, keiretsu are not anti-competitive and have nothing to do with price-
fixing.”).  
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efficient—given the size of the existing, pre-liberalization, local market. The 
international competitor, on the other hand, has a 1500-gallon reactor—
adequately sized to efficiently service his larger market, which spans several 
countries. The competitor also enjoys complementary managerial expertise built 
over several years of competing internationally, as well as economies of scale that 
enable him to provide product at prices considerably lower than those of the local 
producer—even when shipping from abroad. In fact, thanks to the enhanced 
volume gained from entering the newly liberalized countries, the international 
competitor can provide even greater price benefits to his new consumers. And 
although the domestic producer could conceivably embrace the liberalization and 
quickly move to replace the suddenly inefficient reactor or manufacturing facility 
with a 1500-gallon one, it is unrealistic and unlikely.48 Credit market constraints 
and domestic labor market rigidities, both features of underdevelopment, are 
likely to act as barriers to entry, expansion, and innovation. Credit constraints 
may limit the ability of domestic firms to finance the fixed costs required to enter 
new markets or introduce adequately competitive production technologies. 
Similarly, labor market rigidities will curtail the firm’s ability to redirect resources 
to a new production line. The fate of the domestic producer, along with the 
associated jobs, is sealed. 
This is a well-trod narrative: the liberalization process is better in the long run 
because, in addition to the fact that consumers benefit from the lower prices, any 
previously poorly utilized resources can be reallocated to better uses.49 In this 
narrative, the domestic firm is impelled to take action. It acts not only to protect 
its rents, but also because it is incapable of effectively adapting to the new 
competitive regime and is existentially threatened by the prospective change. 
More realistically, in most instances of reform or transitioning, competing 
interests take competing positions on the direction of change.50 But even within 
 
 48.  The original insight is from Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 671, 673 (1975) (arguing that the initial benefits of government largesse are quickly 
capitalized and often sold to others at rent-inflated capital values. Those who purchase the asset only 
earn a normal return on their investments. If the privilege should ever be withdrawn, the later entrants 
would incur a capital loss. To avoid such an outcome, the holders of the rent-generating assets will lobby 
aggressively against any such removal of benefits or privileges). See also Dani Rodrik, Policy Uncertainty 
and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 36 J. DEV. ECON. 229, 230 (1991) (capital investment is 
partially irreversible in that there are sunk costs of entry and exit when physical capital is committed or 
moved from one sector to another). 
 49.  See, e.g., Niraj Dawar & Tony Frost, Competing With Giants: Survival Strategies for Local 
Companies in Emerging Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1999, at 119, 126; Kenneth Kletzer & 
Pranab Bardham, Credit Markets and Patterns of International Trade, 27 J. DEV. ECON. 57, 75–76 (1987) 
(showing that countries with a relatively well-developed financial sector have a comparative advantage 
in industries and sectors that rely on external finance); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Schleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 307, 321 
(2008) (financially underdeveloped countries typically have higher regulatory barriers to entry); James 
Levinsohn, Testing the Imports-as-Market Discipline Hypothesis, 35 J. INT’L ECON. 1, 1–9 (1993). 
 50.  The impact of political instability and uncertainty on investment and firm decisionmaking is well 
established. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political Instability, and 
Investment, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1203 (1996); Nick Bloom, Stephen Bond & John Van Reenen, 
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this more complex frame the political economy landscape hardly changes. Firms 
in a sector that has already committed to a particular technology and governance 
structure have invested in resources, capital, and organizational capabilities that 
are likely to be specific to the status quo.51 As a result, their value declines if the 
status quo changes; this is the case of the hypothetical domestic producer 
previously described. By contrast, any sector that has embraced flexible practices, 
or is better capable of weathering change, as well as the increased competition 
promised by the change in status quo, is less likely to be hindered by sunk costs. 
Thus, with no vested interest in the status quo, the innovative firm is less likely 
to oppose change and more likely to favor it. 
The presence of non-trivial, sunk resources among import-competing 
industries—those which may result in a significant loss of rents—provides a 
potent incentive to seek protection. The import-competing industry generally has 
more to lose than the export industry has to gain, so the incentives for protection 
can be stronger than the pro-liberalization forces.52 
Firms and workers concentrated in import-competing industries are likely to 
oppose liberalization in order to prevent rent erosion. However, their recent 
efforts have been less a response to the elimination of tariffs, given the decline in 
international trade and diminishing relevance of tariffs.53 Tariffs have been 
 
Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 391, 391 (2007); Yi Feng, Political Freedom, 
Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and Private Investment in 
Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 271, 271–72 (2001); Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional 
Environment for Infrastructure Investment, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 355 (2002); Rodrik, supra note 
48; Jakob Svensson, Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability: Theory and Evidence, INST. OF 
INT’L ECON. STUD. 1, 2–5 (1994); Kyle Handley & Nuno Limao, Trade and Investment Under Policy 
Uncertainty: Theory and Firm Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17790, 
2012); Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis, Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21633, 2015).  
 51.  See Rodrik, supra note 48.  
 52.  The idea of economic losers rebuffing (economically) efficient change to preserve rents has a 
long history in economics and especially in explaining why free trade is not adopted.  Raquel Fernandez 
& Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform—Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual Specific Uncertainty, 
81 AM. ECON. REV. 1146 (1991) (showing how uncertainty about the incidence of benefits and costs 
prevents reform from taking place); Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Jr., Resistance to New 
Technology and Trade Between Areas, 19 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 2 (1995); Sanjay Jain 
& Sarun W. Mukand, Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 256, 257 (2003) (“reforms may still not be enacted. Under individual specific uncertainty about the 
outcome of reform, the incumbent fears not only that it will turn out to be a loser, but that the new 
government will be drawn from the ranks of the winners, with no incentive no make compensatory 
transfers.”); Raghuram G. Rajan, Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment, 1 AM. 
ECON. J. MACROECONOMICS 178 (2009) (proposing a model where initial inequalities in endowments 
divides voters into constituencies with competing interests in different reforms potentially lead to reform 
paralysis as each constituency protects their own rents).  For more detail, including their own contribution 
regarding how the fear of losing political power influences policy, see Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson 
& James Robinson, Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 385–472 (Phillippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005).  
 53.  The most recent data suggests that trade is not only not keeping up with global output growth 
but has started to decline. The OECD reported in late May 2015 that total merchandise exports and 
imports, in current U.S. dollars, for the G7 countries and the major emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, 
RODRIGUEZ&MENON_PROOF_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2016  9:40 AM 
No. 4 2016] CAUSES OF COMPETITION AGENCY INEFFECTIVENESS 55 
 
progressively declining and are at historical lows, especially in free-trade areas 
such as ASEAN, SADC, and others.54 Instead, those seeking protection turn to 
standards or quality regulations, local content requirements, government 
procurement regulations, and other non-tariff barriers.55 
Increasing non-tariff barriers threaten to reverse trade liberalization—or 
compromise its impact.56 This is because they stand to obtain concentrated, 
immediate, and visible benefits from policy reversals. On the other side of the 
political ledger, the primary beneficiaries of trade reforms may be unable to 
adequately articulate the promised gains of the reforms. Moreover, reform 
supporters may be economically, geographically, and temporally widely 
 
India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) fell by 7.1% and 9.5%, respectively, in the first quarter of 2015 
relative to the previous quarter. Bernard Hoekman, Trade and Growth—End of an Era?, in THE 
GLOBAL TRADE SLOWDOWN: A NEW NORMAL? 3, 4 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2015). Hoekman’s work 
contains a discussion of possible explanations for the slowdown in global trade. Chapters 15 and 17 are 
especially relevant, where contributors appraise the likely influence of domestic protectionism in the 
reduction of trade. Simon J. Evenett & Johannes Fritz, Crisis-Era Trade Distortions Cut LDC Export 
Growth by 5.5% per Annum, in THE GLOBAL TRADE SLOWDOWN: A NEW NORMAL? 267 (Bernard 
Hoekman ed., 2015); Simon J. Evenett & Johannes Fritz, ‘Peak Trade’ in the Steel Sector, in THE GLOBAL 
TRADE SLOWDOWN: A NEW NORMAL? 303 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2015). The United States has many 
free trade agreements in place, many with developing economies. Practically all explicitly seek reductions 
or the elimination altogether of tariffs. Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/LQZ4-7TN4]. For successful 
instances of tariff reduction, see SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/ 
about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ [https://perma.cc/8EZE-VXG9] (noting that 85% of 
intra-regional trade amongst the partner states attained zero duty by 2008); More Import Duties Reduced 
to 0% under ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, FED’N MALAY. MANUFACTURERS 
http://www.fmm.org.my/International_Trade-@-_More_Import_Duties_Reduced_to_0-p_under_ASE 
AN_Free_Trade_Agreement_%28ITP-s-11-s-2009%29.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4XM-A97J] (hailing the 
achievement of 0% import duties).  
 54.  See, e.g., Tim Büthe, The Politics of Market Competition: Trade and Antitrust in a Global 
Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 213 
(Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015). There is theoretical and empirical evidence that argues that trade policy 
agreements themselves are endogenous; that is to say, they occur, or are accepted as a result, in response 
to a nation’s internal political conditions. See Emily Blanchard & Xenia Matschke, U.S. Multinationals 
and Preferential Market Access 1, 1 (Research Papers in Econ. No. 8/10, 2010), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88669 [https://perma.cc/JL5D-P3JM] (finding that to the extent that 
governments tailor their commercial policies in response to the interests of constituent industries, 
differences in the pattern of firm operations across the globe may be reenacted in trade policy). 
 55.  Leidy & Hoekman, supra note 37, at 113 (“The idea is that under existing protection or under 
the prospect of protection resources will be diverted from the production of goods and services to directly 
unproductive lobbying activity. This either enhances the likelihood of protection, or influences the 
distribution of intervention-generated revenues among competing interests.”); MEHTA, ET. AL., infra 
note 89, at 9–11 (“Market-oriented regulatory reforms, especially competition and regulatory laws, are 
often viewed with apprehension by most constituencies in developing countries. Even those who are 
expected to benefit from open markets and competition, in particular consumers and new businesses 
created after deregulation of previously reserved markets, are reluctant towards reforms due to 
misinformation or ignorance.”). 
 56.  MEHTA, ET. AL., infra note 89, at 8 (“Market-oriented regulatory reforms, especially 
competition and regulatory laws, are often viewed with apprehension by most constituencies in 
developing countries. Even those who are expected to benefit from open markets and competition, in 
particular consumers and new businesses created after deregulation of previously reserved markets, are 
reluctant towards reforms due to misinformation or ignorance.”). 
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dispersed and consequently face severe transaction costs in cooperating to defend 
their interests.57 
In most countries, affected parties, including companies, unions, and 
industries, can seek protection and relief from injury due to imports and other 
competitive threats in any number of ways. For example, domestic interests can 
prevent rent erosion by availing themselves of antidumping protocols and other 
safeguards to have duties placed on imports sold at “less than fair value.”58 They 
can also solicit preferential treatment from their government via advantageous 
access to foreign exchange, tax relief, differential pricing schemes, regulatory 
barriers, subsidies, quotas, and other similar mechanisms.59 Affected parties may 
also lobby for domestic currency devaluations, an alternative that would make 
imports more expensive relative to domestic products.60 
Many nations presently undergoing reforms have benefited from the 
presence of historical groups formed along ethnic, regional, filial, tribal, political 
or economic lines. This collaboration among interwoven sets of keiretsu-like 
business groups and related institutions is a practice that some scholars refer to 
as “crony capitalism” or, perhaps more elegantly, as “relationship capitalism.”61  
Chinese migrants settling in foreign countries developed and relied on the 
practice of guanxi, or networks of specially developed relationships. Guanxi has 
provided a traditional means of managing transactional opportunism thereby 
reducing search and transaction costs and reduced environmental uncertainty. 
The practice of guanxi involves drawing on interpersonal, reciprocal relationships  
  
 
 57. See John Constantelos, The Europeanization of Interest Group Politics in Italy: Business 
Associations in Rome and the Regions, 11 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1020, 1021 (2004) (“Research shows that 
state and non-state actors use a variety of subnational, national, and supranational channels to influence 
EU policy and that multi-level policy networks are developing.”); William Easterly & Ross Levine, 
Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1203, 1205 (1997) (“ . . . cross-
country differences in ethnic diversity explain a substantial part of the cross-country differences in public 
policies, political instability, and other economic factors associated with long-run growth”). 
 58.  See supra note 50. 
 59.  Doug Bandow, The First World’s Misbegotten Legacy to the Third World, in THE REVOLUTION 
IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 213 (James A. Dorn, Steve H. Hanke & Alan A. Walters eds., 1998) 
(“Intervention took many forms: restrictive licensing of businesses, such as cotton ginneries; tight import 
regulations; and state monopolies in state exports. The best known export controls involved cocoa, but 
trade in cotton, palm oil and groundnuts was similarly controlled. Agricultural marketing boards, which 
invariably offered farmers below market prices for their crops, were a related Western creation. These 
disruptive measures, which benefited powerful interest groups while impoverishing the great mass of 
people, were part of the administrative apparatus handed to incoming governments upon 
independence.”). 
 60.  CARLOS D. RAMIREZ, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CURRENCY MANIPULATION BASHING, 
DEP’T OF ECON., GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 1, 4 (2012) (finding that PAC money from groups that 
supported the enactment of the September 2010 law [for the United States] is by far the most important 
determinant of China (currency manipulation) bashing). 
 61.  See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FOR THE CAPITALISTS 
247–51 (2003); Petruzzella, infra note 76, at 3. 
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either through directly known parties, or indirectly known third parties. The 
objective of the practice is to minimize business risk.62 
Extant groups originally may have formed to marshal scarce capital, to 
overcome the scarcity in administrative and managerial talent and rely on tribal, 
filial, ethnic, and other similar ties to ensure reputation and minimize the 
principal–agent problems that bedevil economies in transition.63 The groups 
forged the social bonds that constitute the foundation of reciprocity and trust. 
Economic transactions like exchange and investment require parties to build up 
trust and other social norms over time, especially in the absence of functioning 
bodies of contract law and systems of property rights.64 Trust can be seen as an 
informal institution based on the prevailing systems of beliefs about the 
behaviors of others. Trust and other informal institutions lower transactions 
costs, thereby facilitating exchange and mutual trade.65 When trust and 
trustworthiness stem from confidence in community sanctions of norms, principal 
and agent relations are enforceable without resorting to legal rules and litigation. 
Many factors influence the success of group economies. Ethnic economies 
rise in response to self-imposed boundaries or in response to obvert or subjective 
constraints established by the dominant societal groups.66 Among the middleman 
groups, these constraints compel cooperation, solidarity and the forging of social 
capital within the group.67 These group traits and practices enabling trust and 
 
 62.  Antony Drew & Anton Kriz, An Institutional Analysis of Chinese Business Relationships, 3 INT’L 
J. VALUE CHAIN MGMT. 356, 367 (2009) (“Responses from all locations indicate that the nature and 
practice of guanxi is still very malleable and that despite the presence of formal politico-legal institutions, 
most agreed that they would use guanxi as a source of competitive advantage, particularly in times of 
scarce resources.”). 
 63.  See e.g., Thomas K. Cheng, How Culture May Change Assumptions in Antitrust Policy, in THE 
GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 205, 205 (D. Daniel Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2012) 
(analyzing the effects between culture and antitrust policy); Jong Ki Lee, Promoting Convergence of 
Competition Policies in Northeast Asia: Culture-Competition Correlation and Its Implication, in THE 
GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 221 (D. Daniel Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2012) (discussing 
the cultural interplay with anti-trust in Northeast Asia); Julian Pena, The Limits of Competition Law in 
Latin America, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 236 (D. Daniel Sokol & Ioannis Lianos 
eds., 2012) (analyzing cultural implications in Latin America); Dwight H. Perkins, Law, Family Ties, and 
the East Asian Way of Doing Business, in CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN 
PROGRESS 232, 232 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000). 
 64.  ROBERT C. ELLICSKON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 167 (1991) (“members of a close-knit group 
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members 
obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”); NORTH, supra note 31, at 36; Cao, supra note 41, at 
1059 (“In numerous and diverse countries, these minorities establish an ethnic community by relying on 
group cohesiveness and homogenous networks to benefit group members.”).  
 65.  Arthur Denzau & Douglass North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 
KYKLOS 3, 20 (1994). 
 66.  Davis, et. al., supra note 42, at 344 (“There are at least two reasons why [invidious discrimination 
may have contributed to East Indians and other groups’ success]. First, discrimination might tend to 
increase a group’s endowment of ‘social capital.’ Second, if a group faces discrimination – lowering the 
returns it can expect to earn from one class of activities – the members will find it advantageous to 
participate in activities in which they face less discrimination.”). 
 67.  Id.  at 345 (“The best-known way in which social capital enhances group wealth is by reducing 
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cooperation rest on “multiplex networks and norms of reciprocity.”68 These 
economic institutions facilitate commercial transactions by reducing uncertainty 
and risk in markets. Groups with a social-capital base of networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit are 
particularly poised to produce economic capital. 
These and other groups assisted the government in administering the former 
state-led economy by implementing policies, minimizing negotiation, and 
supplying the necessary group discipline.69 Firms assembled into collaborative 
interest groups to overcome limitations in transportation, labor markets, 
communications, and credit.70 
Yet, once formed, the same governance structures erect barriers to entry and 
other mechanisms designed to ensure the preservation of the group’s rents 
largely at the expense of causing higher prices and productive inefficiencies that 
directly impact consumers.71 
The emergence of industrial and regional groups—often family-owned—is a 
direct consequence of the institutions that existed historically. Yet, these 
institutions persist today. Douglass North observes that informal constraints and 
norms provide “continuity so that the informal solution to exchange problems in 
the past carries over into the present and makes those informal constraints 
important sources of continuity in long-run societal change.”72 
But available commentary ignores the political dimensions of the state’s 
agents. The commentary therefore lacks a clear understanding of the potential 
pitfalls agencies embrace when challenging non-tariff barriers, especially those 
sanctioned by other arms of the government, and when failing to account for the 
beneficial effects of the economic groups. The next part turns to that concern. 
 
the costs of contracting with in the group. There are a number of forms of social capital that might 
produce this effect. . . . By providing channels for the transmission of information about past conduct, 
social networks make it relatively inexpensive for members of the network to screen potential trading 
partners and to ensure the enforcement of social sanctions for past misconduct. . . . [C]ultural and 
linguistic factors may make it relatively easy for members of the same ethnic group to assess one another’s 
trustworthiness and to achieve mutual understanding. Finally, trading partners selected from within the 
same ethnic group may, on average, be more trustworthy than outsiders if group norms discourage 
opportunistic behavior within the group.”). 
 68.  VICTOR NEE & SONJA OPPER, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS FROM NETWORKS 1 (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/wp71_NeeOpper_Institutions 
fromNetworks.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8KW-39GA]. See also NORTH, supra note 31, at 40. 
 69.  Davis, et. al., supra note 42, at 349 (“[T]he regulatory environment is extremely complex in many 
developing countries. Large, established firms may have an advantage in negotiating thickets of 
regulation because of their experience and because they can spread the fixed costs of establishing and 
maintaining political contacts over larger streams of revenue.”).  
 70.  Khanna & Palepu, supra note 29, at 41 (“Successful groups effectively mediate between their 
member companies and the rest of the economy.”). 
 71.  Davis, et. al., supra note 42, at 348 (“If, for some reason, the producers who initially achieve high 
levels of output are concentrated in one particular ethnic group, the presence of increasing returns to 
scale will lead to the perpetuation and even enhancement of the group’s dominance.”).  
 72.  NORTH, supra note 31, at 37. See also NEE & OPPER, supra note 68, at 12.  
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V 
THE COMPETITION POLICY DILEMMA 
What is the dilemma? If the competition agency successfully prosecutes the 
anti-competitive practices of the merchant groups, it is likely to unintentionally 
destroy or impair a storied and rich source of pro-competitive benefits. There is 
more. Again, if the competition agency successfully prosecutes the business 
group practices, it sows the seeds of its own ineffectiveness in the long run. In 
response to the prosecution, groups are likely to turn to the state and solicit 
preferential treatment or seek official or implicit immunity from antitrust 
processes.73 This would substitute non-tariff barriers and other instances of 
protectionism for private anti-competitive practices. Given the ease with which 
protectionist measures are made available, no interest group would seek to create 
a naked cartel to begin with. Thus, antitrust policy promises the prosecution of 
private sector activities that hardly exist. 
Commentators, including erstwhile avid proponents and supporters of 
competition policy in transition economies have acknowledged the limited 
impact enforcement agencies have had. Ignacio De Leon recently stated: 
[T]he empirical evidence gathered after two decades of inception in developing 
countries shows that competition policy implementation is far from being successful in 
many developing countries. Some competition authorities appear to be making progress 
in defining a sound policy agenda and displaying a strong commitment towards the 
development of a level playing field; whereas others, after a promising start, seem to 
have faded into oblivion or struggling their way through.74 
 
 And former President of the Portuguese Competition Authority Abel Mateus 
stated: 
The following factors restrict the effectiveness of a competition enforcement regime: 
(1) vested interests that dominate economic policy making, either through legal means 
(party financing, lobbying, influence in the nomination of the government, senior 
officials, or the council of the national competition authority (NCA) or illegal means 
(corruption, abuse of public service power, or cronyism); (2) inefficient public 
administration and regulatory systems that limit the capacity and effectiveness of public 
 
 73.  UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 35, at 11 (“. . . various businesses are 
likely to be still unaware of the potential impact that competition law can have on their economic 
activities, and lobbying for exclusions from the application of competition law may yet take place. Indeed, 
casual observation suggests that in more advanced industrial countries, exemptions granted from 
competition law have generally tended to evolve and expand over time because of specific issues and 
cases confronted in the application of the law, and the resulting lobbying by business.”). 
 74.  Ignacio De Leon, What are the Relevant Features for Assessing Economic Competition in 
Developing Countries? 1 (Nov. 1, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169905 [https://perma.cc/2BSH-
JSMP]. De Leon’s soul-searching is telling because he is among the most influential practitioners and 
commentators in the field of international competition policy; he is not only an experienced antitrust 
practitioner himself—having led the Venezuelan Competition agency in its early days—but as an 
independent consultant De Leon has actively provided training and support for countless competition 
agencies around the world, ranging from Kazakhstan to the Dominican Republic. Importantly, his 
extensive writings and commentary on the topic alone distinguishes him as an important voice in these 
debates.  
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bodies, including the NCA; and (3) inefficient judicial systems that preclude the 
sanctioning of violation of the competition law.75 
Giovanni Petruzzella, head of the Italian competition authority, characterizes 
the presence and influence of these business conglomerates in Italy and describes 
a general difficulty: 
The target of this current of thought is crony capitalism, which in Italy is called 
relationship capitalism. The latter is based on the interweaving of few big economic 
powers, on their relationships with the political and administrative powers, on the 
research of “situational rents”. Crony capitalism is based on privileges, rather than on 
merits; it worsens inequalities, it makes society closed, static, not very much open to 
competition and innovation. Likewise, it sacrifices individuals’ ambition of being able 
to improve their social position exclusively owing to their merits. Therefore, it 
prejudices the particular form of equality which is equality of opportunities. These 
tendencies, in Countries such as Italy, have favored the expansion of an unproductive 
and inefficient public expenditure, as regards some of its components, aimed at 
satisfying particularistic interests of lobbies and of rent seekers. Also this has 
contributed in creating the enormous public debt which constitutes a big obstacle for 
economic growth and an unfair burden on the new generations.76 
And from the World Bank’s Competition Policy Team: Anti-cartel 
enforcement continues to be a challenge in developing countries where 
government policies still facilitate the creation and sustainability of cartel 
behavior among firms.77 
The World Bank commentators diagnose the problem as an operational one, 
arguing that the implementation and enforcement practices have been 
ineffective. And they recommend doubling-down on deterrence practices, 
removing exemptions, improving and enhancing investigating powers, and other 
direct enforcement tools.78 
These recommendations are misguided and shortsighted. But they are 
entirely reasonable if it is assumed that the challenged narrow practices serve 
only the private interests of the business or interest group—and have only anti-
competitive consequences. The implicit frame guiding the prosecutorial effort is 
that the social, political, and economic context in which the enforcement 
machinery is introduced resembles the one prevalent in western economies. 
Interest groups choose whether to obtain anti-competitive rents from 
cartelization, seek favors from the state, or, more likely, both. Interest groups will 
choose the combination of private collusion and government protection that 
 
 75.  Abel Mateus, supra note 10, at 115–16.  
 76.  Giovanni Petruzzella, Presentation of the Competition Authority’s Annual Report, 1 IT. 
ANTITRUST REV., no. 2, 2014, at 1, 3.  
 77.  See GRACIELA MIRALLES-MURCIEGO, CARTEL EXEMPTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
RECENT WORK FROM THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Sept. 2, 2013), https://www.competition 
policyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/CartelSeptember2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD3U-VMKF]. See 
also EUGENIO RIVERA & CLAUDIA SCHATAN, LOS MERCADOS EN EL ISTMO CENTROAMERICANO Y 
MEXICO, QUE HA PASADO CON LA COMPETENCIA? (2006).  
 78.  See MIRALLES-MURCIEGO, supra note 77. See also Martha Licetti-Martinez, Combining Cartels 
in Developing Countries: Implementation Challenges on the Ground, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Sept. 
27, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345402 [https://perma.cc/QD3U-VMKF]. 
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maximizes their narrow expected benefits derived from the state’s involvement. 
Rent-maximizing interest groups will devote resources to cartelization and 
government influence based on the relative costs of the two activities. 
The level of benefits obtained by the interest group increases in both the 
amounts of rent-seeking and cartelization efforts the group undertakes. For any 
given budget or level of resources, the group prefers more benefit to less. Thus, 
a group will choose its level of activity devoted to cartelization and lobbying at 
the point at which their incremental costs approximate their benefits. 
If an antitrust agency is established and actively and credibly sets out to 
enforce proscribed practices, the unit price of cartelization efforts rises. 
Obviously, economies of scale and scope in political influence may cause 
different firms to face different relative prices for particular resources. However, 
as the costs of cartelization rise relative to rent-seeking, at the margin the interest 
group will seek more rent through government protection and this 
correspondingly reduces their efforts toward private cartelization. 
Thus, the establishment of an antitrust regime may, in response to this 
demand, cause an increase in the availability of other forms of government 
protection. If the activities of an antitrust agency only make it more difficult to 
cartelize privately, the special-interest group is worse off than it was before. It 
will reduce its private collaboration efforts, but will shift resources into 
monopolization gained through government protection. 
VI 
THE TYRANNY OF BEST PRACTICES AND OTHER CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The underwhelming performance of the highly heralded competition policy 
programs in developing countries may be a result of the perplexing deployment 
of programs that are best at focusing on violations of narrow horizontal 
proscriptions—that is, violations by naked, private cartels. In developing 
economies this is a target that is hardly ever present. However, if antitrust is to 
ascend in influence over time, it should nonetheless, tenaciously continue to focus 
solely on horizontal, per se proscriptions. Deployed in its full majesty, antitrust 
can be counterproductive and impair growth. 
The model that has been adopted by many economies alongside pro-market 
liberalization and reform is a program based on the economic efficiency, 
consumer-welfare maximizing approach common to western economies.79 This 
“best practices” approach may recognize—and expect—that powerful industry 
 
 79. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED 
MONOPOLIES 5 (2007) (“Two of these nine objectives – the promotion of consumer welfare and the 
maximization of efficiency – were identified by the vast majority of ICN member respondents.”); Dina I. 
Waked, Antitrust Goals in Developing Countries:  Policy Alternatives and Normative Choices, 38 
SEATTLE U.L. REV. 945, 952 (2015) (“A consumer welfare standard to guide antitrust policy defines the 
mainstream today. It is the most widespread welfare criterion pronounced in developed countries’ 
antitrust laws and case law, and it is also the standard most widely replicated by developing countries.”).  
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groups, which stand in opposition to reform, do so out of a natural desire to 
protect their historical monopoly rents. But it fails to recognize that these groups 
also constitute surviving institutional organizations capable of overcoming 
historical resource limits and institutional constraints. These are entities that 
convey substantive, and often pro-competitive, benefits to the proper functioning 
and stability of the state. 
The competition agencies’ conventional analytical tool box is incapable of 
understanding the role and relevance of the array of historical transactions costs 
and other difficulties that led to the formation of groups. And it is hard-pressed 
to appraise their value, let alone the tradeoffs incurred in the removal of anti-
competitive costs against the historical pro-competitive benefits. 
The dual contribution imparted by interest groups and the ability and ease of 
substitution between private cartels and state-backed protective measures 
suggest the following hypothesis: the equilibrium level of antitrust enforcement 
in developing economies is likely to be much more modest than those in 
developed economies. Relatedly, the equilibrium level of antitrust enforcement 
is likely lower in nations where the influence of immigrant, political, regional, or 
ethnic group-controlled businesses looms large. 
Yet to the extent that this understanding of the dual nature of groups is 
disregarded and their relevance ignored, then, by extension, one would expect to 
find an observed increase over time in non-tariff barriers, protective regulations, 
and other similar protectionist measures or outright exemptions from the 
antitrust laws as interest groups lobby successfully to obtain preferential 
treatment to counter the pressures of competition and competition agency 
enforcement actions. Two more outcomes would also be expected. First: antitrust 
is likely to turn—over time—to targeting the vulnerable, the politically 
unprotected, and the economically unimportant—the local hot-dog vendor.80 
And second: the competition agency will be deliberately underfunded to curtail 
its reach.81 
  
 
 80.  R.A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 126 (1995) (“[I]t should never be 
assumed that any ideal antitrust policy will survive unscathed the hurly-burly pressures of a political 
environment, in which the incentives for individual actors often cut at cross-purposes with the one 
sensible objective of an antitrust law. Quite simply, it is too easy in a political setting to forge an antitrust 
law that is more intent on protecting the position of marginal competitors than on ensuring the 
preservation of open markets.”). In an instance of the “hot-dog vendor effect” the antitrust agency of 
Panama—known as the CliCac (Comision de Libre Competencia y Asuntos del Consumidor; Free trade 
and Consumer Affairs Commission)—once came down harshly against the Panama City association of 
private high schools citing the practice of compelling students to buy uniforms from the same retail outlet 
as an anti-competitive practice; the agency investigated but ultimately brought no charges. See Acalorada 
discusión entre CLICAC y representantes de colegios privados, EL PANAMA AMERICA (Oct. 22, 1999) 
http://portal.critica.com.pa/archivo/102899/nac6.html [https://perma.cc/E8J9-LCZJ].  
 81.  See Mateus, supra note 10, at 136 (finding that “countries around the world, including a 
substantial number of developed countries, have not provided, have not provide enough resources for 
their national competition authorities to fulfill their basic duties”).  
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Still, despite the limited numbers of prospective targets, prohibitions on price-
fixing activities enforced on a per se standard should constitute the core antitrust 
policy of a program in its early stages. Remedies should not vindicate 
underperforming existing competition policy programs. Reforms that would 
convert the enforcement agencies into useful policy tools of economic growth 
would effectively render the result a competition policy unrecognizable to 
anyone familiar with its inception elsewhere in the developed world. 
Similarly, a focus on fostering trade and entrepreneurship by eliminating 
regulatory barriers, what is known in the trade as competition advocacy, is a 
toothless endeavor. Agencies have little popular and political support or even 
appeal for speaking out against non-tariff barriers. These activities are better 
discharged by independent think tanks, academics, and pro-market private 
interest groups.  
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APPENDIX 
COMPETITION POLICY PERFORMANCE 
The Anti-monopoly performance index published by the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is a widely cited performance 
metric. The latest compilation provides a visual representation of agency 
performance across regional groupings over the last decade.82 The GCR surveys 
businessmen to rate the effectiveness of the antitrust policy in their particular 
country, asking them to rate “antimonopoly” policy on a Likert scale; where 1 
represents an antimonopoly policy that “does not promote competition” to a 7, 
where antimonopoly policy “effectively promotes competition.”83 The 
memberships of the groupings in the chart are assembled by the GCR. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The observed time trend suggests improvement across all groups and 
considerable improvement in the performance of the agencies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This article attempts to explain this gap. And the initial visual 
examination of the data is consistent with our argument: that the equilibrium 
level of antitrust will be lower in developing economies. However, it is difficult 
 
 82.  See WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2014–2015 (2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
V35A-CUU4].  
 83.  Id. at 468. 
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to be certain based on this data alone. 
The practice of using perception-based surveys either individually or as an 
input into a composite measure, has raised concerns.84 Among these are questions 
about the basic validity of the surveys, inter-rater reliability and sensitivity to 
external biases as well as to the inferences drawn.85 Concerns have been raised as 
to raters’ understanding of antitrust and especially the goals of antitrust because 
antitrust is a novelty in many developing countries.86 Concerns have been raised 
about raters’ susceptibility to cognitive biases, such as halo and devil effects, 
vividness, and recency.87 
 
 84. See CHRISTINE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNMENT 
INDICATORS, (2006), http://www.la.utexas.edu/users/chenry/polec/2006/oecd/AE795835C8392A811 
1572211048C64BBAF3DA2573E.pdf [https://perma.cc/X42A-NWXQ]; DANI RODRIK, GETTING 
INSTITUTIONS RIGHT 6 (2004) (“The manner in which institutional quality is measured in the empirical 
literature that is discussed above leaves a lot of questions unanswered.”), http://drodrik.scholar. 
harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/getting-institutions-right.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX2C-FGD5]; 
STEVEN VAN DE WALLE, MEASURING BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY IN GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 7 
(2005) (“The World Bank Governance indicators dataset is one of the most complete datasets to assess 
the quality of governance. Many of its composing indicators, however, are of a subjective nature, and 
therefore do not necessarily present us with a correct picture.”), http://pmranet.org/conferences/ 
USC2005/USC2005papers/pmra.vandewalle.2005.pdf; Stephen Knack, The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Six, One, or None?, 46 J. DEV. STUD. 350, 351 (2010) (“There is little if any evidence on the 
concept validity of the six WGI indexes.”); Marcus J. Kurtz & Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance: 
Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 538 (2007) (“Our results suggest that the dominant 
measures of governance are problematic, suffering from perceptual biases, adverse selection in sampling, 
and conceptual conflation with economic policy choices.”); Marcus J. Kurtz & Andrew Schrank, Growth 
and Governance: a Defense, 69 J. POL. 563, 565 (2007) (“We maintain that perception-based indicators of 
governance in general, and the KKM indicator of GE in particular, are overly dependent on the 
impressions of businesspeople.”); Laura Langbein & M.A. Thomas, WHAT DO THE WORLDWIDE 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS MEASURE? (2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.590.3190&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/3U2M-D9AQ]; Stephen Knack, Measuring 
Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators (World Bank 
Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 3968, 2006), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3968 
[https://perma.cc/9CWM-3AA9].  
 85. ARNDT & OMAN, supra note 84; RODRICK, supra note 84, VAN DE WALLE, supra note 84; 
Knack, supra note 84; Kurtz & Schrank, Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, supra note 84; Kurtz & 
Schrank, Defense, supra note 84; Langbein & Thomas, supra note 84. 
 86.  For example, some developing world GCR survey businessmen respondents feel that 
competition in the form of foreign direct investment or foreign entry often arrives relying on below-cost 
pricing. A variant of the oft-discussed “Wal-Mart effect,” this practice is routinely labeled, pejoratively, 
as predatory pricing. It is believed that the new competitor is pricing its products below cost in a 
calculated effort to take market share, drive local firms out of business, or both. A “challenge” by the 
anti-monopoly office would therefore elicit “good marks” by someone holding that view. Others, more 
comfortable with the conventional view of predatory practices, will recognize the agency’s action as 
political and protectionist—and would assign a “negative mark” to the agency’s performance. 
 87.  Individuals are likely to recall recent newspaper headlines or prior mental schemas to aid or 
assist decisionmaking. News coverage likely reflects the media’s tendency to call attention to unusual or 
infrequent events. Thus, if survey respondents are asked to appraise the performance of the competition 
office, they may assess the parallels or similarities between the competition agency and a particular 
government agency (not necessarily the competition agency) caught up in a recent corruption scandal, 
for example. Or they may recall headlines in the local news media recounting a recent or ongoing EU or 
American antitrust investigation and combine it with their understanding of what “competition policy” 
or “protecting competition” entails. Perception of the “facts” is often distorted by the most available, 
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Individual agency performance scores are routinely compared to average 
regional scores88 or income groupings. But such comparisons make no sense 
statistically. Implicit in the construction and usage of these indexes as 
performance yardsticks is a perception that the difference between 2 and 3 means 
the same thing as the difference between 5 and 6. They also assume that a rating 
of 3 means the same thing to different raters and to raters in different countries. 
They also imply that the competition programs are similar across nations and are 
therefore commensurable. 
This is not necessarily the case. Some agencies benefit from more experienced 
staff at different stages of its development, or a considerably different budget. 
The nature of the interaction between the different agency leadership and staff 
and its domestic constituencies vary: some operate in a hostile environment; 
others in one less so. Some competition programs have narrow policy objectives. 
Others have many policy outcomes that may matter much more, reflecting 
dimensions of governance such as a government’s commitment to: growth and 
democracy as a political objective; fostering conditions for successful 
entrepreneurship; enlarging the pool of managerial talent; addressing abject 
poverty; eliminating or reducing discrimination in all forms; and redressing 
inequality.89 The assessment score of the performance of an agency acting on the 
basis of violations of efficiency considerations cannot be the same assessment 
when an agency is challenging a practice aimed at reducing racial inequality. 
Thus, although it is not clear how one can establish fair comparisons across 
agencies when the policy outcomes vary, it is clear that the task is an impossible 
one via GCR-style surveys. 
There are statistical pitfalls as well. The GCR scores are ordinal categories of 
performance—a ranking from 1 to 7. But the numbers are simple descriptors or 
labels of a particular category that is often arbitrary and subjective in its 
 
most recent or most vivid information. This piggy-backing on our innate “pattern-matching” processes is 
an example of the “availability” heuristic. The problem arises when our use of the heuristic results in a 
biased appraisal of the agency’s actual performance. If the resulting association is a positive one, it is 
considered a halo effect, in which the agency benefits from good press or good recall of a noteworthy 
case. Conversely, a negative association such as inferring or presuming that agency officials are corrupt 
only because corruption is endemic in the other administrative agencies of the government is a bias of 
obvious negative effects, a devil effect.  
 88.  See, e.g., Figure 1. 
 89.  INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 79 (“Respondents identified ten different objectives 
of unilateral conduct laws, regulations, and policies, with all but one member agency identifying more 
than one objective as relevant to their unilateral conduct regimes. As detailed in Annex A to the Report, 
these objectives (listed in order of the number of times cited by respondents) include: ensuring an 
effective competitive process; promoting consumer welfare; maximizing efficiency; ensuring economic 
freedom; ensuring a level playing field for small and medium size enterprises; promoting fairness and 
equality; promoting consumer choice; achieving market integration; facilitating privatization and market 
liberalization; and promoting competitiveness in international markets.”). PRADEEP S. MEHTA, ET. AL, 
POLITICS TRUMPS ECONOMICS – LESSONS AND EXPERIENCES ON COMPETITION AND REGULATORY 
REGIMES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007). See also De Leon, supra note 74, at 23; RODRIGUEZ 
& MENON, supra note 3, at 84. 
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construction. Aside from revealing a natural order to the ranking, the labels do 
not represent values. 
Consider the following example by way of explanation. Suppose that instead 
of a numeric scale, the scale was from A to G, where A is considered the best 
performer. How would one find the average of the following ascribed scores: {A, 
A, C, D, E, A, G, B}? It is impossible. Suppose that the scale were not a 7-
category scale A to G but rather, a 3-category scale A to C. The scores would be 
then be: {A, A, C, C, C, A, C, B}. One would still be unable to find the average. 
But one would also obtain entirely different performance outcomes.  For 
example, the fourth nation in the ordering would be ranked below the third 
nation in the 7-category scale; but they would be equally ranked in the 3-category 
scale. 
In addition, setting aside the difficulties with ordinal categories, an 
understanding of the variation in agency performance matters. Without 
knowledge of the distribution of the scores it is impossible to determine whether 
differences in performance between an agency and the regional or income-group 
average are meaningful. Statistical significance is the coin of the realm when 
appraising the meaningfulness of differences. 
 
